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STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND ON PROPOSED CHANGE IN CLCYrURE 
RULE OF THE SENATE, ON SENATE FLOOR, JANUARY,.i_, 1959. 
,-
MR. PRESIDENT~ 
I am unalterably opposed to any change in the present cloture 
rule of the Senate which would increase the power of the majority 
to put a gag on the minority. 
-two=-r-~ ~~ • It is my firm opinion that the rule by which ttih••• .fa••••ii of 
· ~ Re:s+,ca.,,·c:+• v-t. a+ i':rQ..e.Et cl ,·sc::.. S'S' ,'o/tl 
the membership can limit debate is aj'1 itr liffl as ~t can be, at the 
present time, without seriously infringing on the right of the 
minority to be heard, the right of the States to equal 
representation, and the preservation of the Senate as a great and 
unique institution. 
The Senate is the last forum on earth where men can discuss 
matters of vital importance without severe restrictions on debate. 
This circumstance is one reason, perhaps the major reason, why the 
Senate has become known as the world's greatest deliberative body 
and why the great English statesman, Gladstone, described the 
Senate as "that remarkable body, the most remarkable of all 
inventions of politics." 
I willingly accept the fact, so frequently pointed out by those 
who would impose gag rule on the Senate, that the rules of this 
body are unusual. Indeed, the Senate is unique among parliamentary 
bodies. It is a great legislative body, and all the greater 
because it has not been constrained to bend to any popular notion 
of what rules a parliamentary body should follow. 
The roots of the Senate rules are founded in history. At the 
time our Constitution was being framed, there was a great reluctanc~ 
on the part of the individual States, to surrender any of their 
cherished liberties to a Federal government. 
At that time, there were some unusual laws and customs in most 
of the individual States. The people within these States were wary 
of surrendering State sovereignty to a Federal government which 
might arbitrarily and hastily nullify State laws. They had recently 
freed themselves from tyranny and secured for themselves individual 
liberty in a great fight for independence. Consequently, 
numerous safeguards to protect the rights of the States were built 
into the Constitution. Before they would assent to the ratification 
I 
time of war, 
in 
of this supreme law, however, they won assurance of early approval 
of the first Ten Amendments to the Constitution. These Amendments, 
commonly referred to as the Bill of Rights, constitute the greatest 
set of civil and individual rights to be found anywhere. 
• . .. t~ •• 
. ~· . . 
liberties and the rights of the 
States, to this body the Bill of Rights: 
ARTICLE I 
no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or pr the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
or of the press; or the right of the people 
, and to petition the Government for a redress 
of grievances. 11 
ARTICLE II 
nA well regulated Militi, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the to keep and bear Arms shall not 
be infringed." 
III 
nNo Soldier shall, in be quartered in any house, 
without the consent of the Owner, nor but in a 
manner prescribed by law. 0 
ARTICLE IV 
'~he right of the people to be secure person, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable sear es and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall iss e, 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or seized." 
ARTICLE V 
''No person shall be held to answer for a otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment o 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public da nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
but upon probable 
capital, o 
ARTICLE VI 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy t~ 
to a speedy 
district wherein 
an 
shall have been committed, 
nor exces 
disparage others retained by 
fines 
e 
shall have been previou ascertained by law, and to be informed 
of the nature and cause e accusation; to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him ; process for obtaining 
impartial jury of the State and 
which district 
witnesses in his favor, and to Counsel for 
his defence." 
0 In suits at common law, controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial j jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherw ere-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to e rules of the 
common law." 
ARTICLE VIII 
"Excessive bail shall not be required, 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
ARTICLE IX 
"The enumeration in the Constitution, 
not be construed to deny or people." 
ARTICLE X 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Cons itution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
\/" One of the principal safeguards built into the original 
Constitution was the formation of a Senate in which every State 
was given equal representation. The Senate was envisioned, by the 
Founding Fathers, as a body where the rights of States, and the 
views of minorities, would be given unusual consideration. During 
the course of the debates of the Philadelphia Constitutional r.. 1 
Convention of 1787, the delegates reached agreement upon a House 
of Representatives to be elected by the people every two years and 
' . 
based upon a population ratio divided into congressional districts. 
After this action was taken, the smaller of the participating 13 · 
States wondered how their minorities could be adequately protected 
from the capricious whims of a majority in the House. 
After long debate which was at times most acrimonious and 
which actually threatened to break up the Convention, the solution 
was offered by the wise and venerable Benjamin Franklin ; namely, 
equal representation in the Senate for every State. And, to make 
sure that that representation would be of a character that would 
calmly consider and patriotically and unselfishly act on laws 
under which all the pecple would have to live, it was provided 
in the original instrument that Members of the Senate should be 
elected by State legislators and not by popular vote and given a 
term of six years. 
The Founding Fathers also wrote into the original Constitution 
other safeguards against what the advocates of a rules change 
term "majority rule." They provided in certain instances for votes 
requiring a majority of two-thirds. ~ ere are some of these 
provisions as found in the Constitution: 
"No person shall be convicted on impeachment without the 
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present~ (art. I, sec. 3) 
"Each House, with the concurrence of two-thirds, may expel a 
Member." (art. I, sec. 5) 
"A bill returned by the President with his objections may be 
repassed by each House by a vote of two-third51 (art i, sec. 7) 
"The President shall have power, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided two-thirds of 
the Senators present concur.'' (art. II, sec. 2) 
11 Congress shall call a convention for proposing amendments to 
the Constitution on the application of two-thirds of the legislatures 
of the several States." (ar~V) 
"Congress shall propose amendments to the Constitution whenever 
two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary." {art. V) 
"When the choice of a President shall devolve upon the House 
or Representatives, a quorum shall consist of a Member of members 
from two-thirds of the various States of the Union." (amendment 12) 
; . 
r 
"A quorum of the Senate, when choosing a Vice President, shall 
consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators! (amendment 12) 
· The Constitution, therefore, does not give recognit:ion, in 
all cases, to the right of the majority to control. 
·· By analogy it requires a two-thirds vote of the Senate to 
single Member. 
Thus, we can see from a glance back into history how concerned 
our forefathers were for protecting the rights of individuals, 
minorities, and the States in drafting the fundamental principles 
of our government. From the start, too, our forefathers recognized 
that these rights could only be secured if adequate protection was 
provided by established rules of procedure. They had the wisdom 
to realize that substantive rights contained in the supreme law 
might be later mutilated or trammeled if procedural safeguards were 
not provided to insure long and careful deliberation of the 
legislative issues which, if approved, might restrict the rights 
,or the individuals, minorities, and the States. 
Thus we firrl the great statesman and political philosopher, ···. :" 
Thomas Jefferson, saying in the preface to his Manual, which he 
deposited with the Senate and which became the recognized guide 
for all our legislative bodies ~ 
"Mr. Onslow, the ablest among the Speakers of the House of 
Commons, used to say it was a maxim he had often heard when he was 
a young man, from old and experienced members, that nothing tended 
more to throw power into the hands of administration, and those 
who acted with the majority of the House of Commons, than a neglect 
of, or departure from, the rules of proceeding ; that these forms, 
as instituted by our ancestors, operated as a check and control 
on the actions of the majority, and that they were, in many instances, 
a shelter and protection to the minority against the attempts of 
power. So far tm maxim is certainly true, and is founded in good 
sense; that as it is always in the power of the majority, by their 
numbers, to stop any improper measure proposed on the part of their 
the only weapons by which the minority can defend 
themselves against similar attempts from those in power are the 
forms and rules of proceeding which have been adopted as they were 
necessary, from time to time, and are become the law of the 
opponents, 
a strict adherence to which the weaker party can only be 
protected from those irregularities and abuses which these forms 
were intended to check and which the wantonness of power is but too 
often apt to suggest to large and successful majorities. 
"And whether these forms be in all cases the most rational or 
not, is really not of so great importance. It is much more material 
that there should be a rule to go by, than what that rule is ; that 
there may be a uniformity of proceeding in business not subject to 
the caprice of the Speaker or captiousness of the members. It is 
very material that order, decency, and regularity be preserved in 
a dignified public body." 
On a subsequent occasion, Mr. Jefferson had this to say concernirg 
the protection of minority interests: 
"Bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of 
the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful, 
must be reasonable ~ that the minority possess their equal rights, 
,.,,. which equal laws must protect, and to violate would be oppression." 
In accordance with the advice of Jefferson, the rulesof the 
Senate were framed to provide for a check on the tyranny of the 
majority. The tradition has been preserved to the present day, 
although the rules of the Senate have been altered on some few 
occasions. 
the Senate rules have served their purpose in 
rights without adversely affecting the rights of the was 
written by Mr. Williams. White, distinguished and 
author of the book, "Citadel--The Story oft 
Senate." It is appropriate be presented to the 
Senate at this time: 
"Conscious though one is e abuse of Senatorial power, 
one glories nevertheless in e circumstances that there is such a 
place, where Big Sen rise and flourish from small States. 
"For ion protects and expresses that last, true 
heart of theory, the triumphant distinction and oneness 
of the indiv· ual arrl of the little State, the infinite variety 
in which is the juice of national life. 
perhaps often forgotten that the democratic ideal is not 
place 
in our time 
land. They 
at once and 
therefore, may be seen as a uniquely Constitutional 
place is here, and here alone, outside the courts--to 
which is not always easy--that the minority will again and 
again the majority's most passionct.e will. 
part of the whole meaning of the Institution. 
Deliberately it Rhode Island in terms of power, on equal 
footing with Deliberately by its tradition and practice 
it rarely closes the door to 
any idea, however wrong, that can possibly be said has 
been said, and said sometimes is high. The time 
killing, sometimes, seems and dangerous. The license, 
sometimes, seems endless ; e who silences the cruel and 
irresponsible man today t recall that the brave and lonely 
man may in the same way tomorrow. 
" •••For illustration, those who filibuster 
against, say, the compulsory civil r~ hts program, might recall 
that the weapon has more than one pleading 
minority could become tomorrow's majority. They might 
recall, too, that the techniques of commun~ ation, and with them 
the drenching power of propaganda, have vast 
when the gaunt aerials thrust upward all 
might recall that the public is not always 
that it is perhaps not too bad to have one 
can be examined at leisure, even if a leisure uncomfo tably prolonged. 
" ••• It is, in the very nature of the Senate, absol 
for the small States to maintain the concept 
power, having in mind that it is only within 
his power can be asserted or maintained. 
necessary 
" •••Where a powerful majority really wants a bill it will 
• 
Throughout the history of our country, majorities have assailed 
the rules of the Senate, because the rules of the Senate act as a 
brake on the will of the majority, especially a radical majority. 
I shall not assign base motives to the various majorities who, 
down through the years, have attempted to change the rules of the 
Senate. Fortunately for the United States, there have been 
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relatively few cases in which a group of Senators, pressing for 
legislation, was not motivated by a sincere desire to benefit the 
country. We can take it as a general rule that the majority always 
thinks it is right. 
Believing themselves to be right, the majority side, in any 
issue, is naturally vexed and eyen angry when it finds its will 
frustrated by a minority. It resents seeing a group which it 
believes to be in the wrong obstructing and delaying the enactment 
of legislation it believes to be useful. 
This is a frustration which can cause a great mind to go 
astray and fall into error. 
I think of Woodrow Wilson, for example. Wilson was one of the 
great students of our government long before his election to the 
Presidency. Writing in 1$81, in his Congressional Government, 
he observed that "the Senate's opportunities for open and 
unrestricted discussion, and its simple, comparatively unencumbered 
forms of procedure, unquestionably enable it to fulfill with every 
considerable success its high functions as a chamber of revision." 
In further expressing his views on free debate in the Senate, 
Wilson made this statement : 
"It is the proper duty of a representative body to look 
diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about 
what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to 
embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress 
have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and 
the disposition of the administrative agents of the Government, the 
country must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless 
Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form 
of discussion the c0untry must remain in embarrassing, crippling 
ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it 
should understand and direct. 
"The informing function of Congress sbc:uld be preferred even to 
its legislative function. The argument is not only that discussed 
and interrogated administration is the only pure and efficient 
administration, but more than that, that the only really self­
governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates 
its administration. The talk on the part of Congress which we 
[' 
sometimes justly condemn is the profitless squa~ble of words 
over frivolous bills or selfish party issues. It would Le hard 
to conceive of there being tbo mtich talk about the practical 
concerns and pro~esse~ of government. Such talk it is which, when 
earnestly and purposefully conducted, clears the public mind and 
the demands of public opinion." 
Long afterward, a minority of the Senate killed President 
Wilson's armed neutrality ship bill. We all remember, I am sure, 
his classic excoriation of the Senate: 
"The Senate of the United States is the only legislat~_ve body 
in the world which cannot act when the majority is ready for 
action. A little group of willful men, representing no opinion 
but their own, have rendered the great Government of the United 
States helpless and contemptible." 
This is one example, a classic one. TJlnere have been many 
cases of Senators who have argued for greater restrictions on 
debate while pressing for a majority point of view, who changed 
their opinions when the heat of debate had cooled. 
This point was de~ply impressed on my mind when I recently 
study
made a thorough/of the issue of free debate in the Senate. I am 
sure that many others have come to this same conclusion after their 
research efforts on this subject. The distinguished senior Senanr 
from Georgia (Mr. Russell), one of the Senate's most able ·.· · ·:., 
parliamentary experts of all time, made a very similar observation 
when testifying before the Senate Rules Committee in 1952. Here 
is what he had to say: 
"I have studied this question of the proposal to institute a 
more restrictive gag rule in the Senate. I once spent a couple of 
weeks in going back over the various occasiomin the history of the 
Senate when these motions, these efforts, have been made to change 
the rules. I was interested to rote two things: That almost always 
those who sought to change the rules to gag his adversary of the 
minority when he was in power became a great advocate of freedom 
of debate when he was translated from the majority to the minority. 
Further, almost invariably men who came to the Senate determined 
to change the Rules of the Senate, if they stayed there long enoughf 
came to defend the rules." 
Perhaps the best so-called 0 proof of the pudding11 on this point 
lies in a statement made by a former President of the United States 
while serving as a member of this distinguished body during the 
period of 1915-20. Listen to these words of the late 
Warren G. Harding: 
"I have been hearing about the reformation of the Senate since 
I first entered politics ; and it was rather an ironical thing the 
other day that one of the most emphatic speeches made in favor of 
the adoption of this rule was uttered by the very latest arrival in 
this body. 
"But the reformation of the Senate has long been a fad. I came 
here myself under the impression that there ought to be cloture 
and limitations on debate ; and the longer I sit in this body, the 
more convinced do I become that the freedom of debate in the United 
States Senate is one of the highest guaranties we have of our 
American institutions. 
"Mr. President, before I take my seat I wish to say that the 
length of a speech is not the measure of its merit. 
"While the Senate may not listen, because the Senate does not 
listen very attentively·to anybody, I discover, though Congress may 
not be apparently concerned and though the galleries of this body 
may not be filled to add their inspiring attention, I charge you 
now, Mr. President, that the people of the United States of 
American will be listening. This is the one central point, the one 
open forum, the one place in America where there is freedom of 
debate, which is essential to an enlightened and dependable public 
sentiment, the guide of the American Republic." 
More than a half century ago Senator Hoar of Massachusetts 
made this point on how experience can change minds: 
"There was a time in my legislative career when I believed 
that the absence of a cloture in the Senate was criminal neglect, 
and that we should adopt a system of rules by which business could 
be conducted; but the logic of my lccg service has now convinced 
me that I was wrong in that contention. There is a virtue in 
unlimited debate, · the philosophy of which cannot be detected upon 
a surface consideration." 
I believe that I understand the desire of some of my colleagues 
//J 
V 
to change the rules of thL Senate. They are a1n:iJUS to ~u~~ into 
law certain proposals which they believe to be right and for which 
... : . they believe they uan count 
a majority of the Senate. 
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the majority has 
been right on every occasion during the deliberations of the $5th 
Congress. I do not believe this for a moment, but let us suppose 
it. If we accept this supposition, it follows that the work of the 
Senate would have proceeded more quickly, and more legislation 
would have been passed, if debate had been severely restricted. 
However, those who believe that the majority has always been right 
during the 85th Congress would hardly have the temerity to predict 
r'/ 
that the majority will always be right in the 86th Congress, or in 
the 186th. 
There inevitably come times when the majority is dead w.i:·ong, 
and these are times when the will of the majority, if unchecked, 
can destroy our American government. Some of the best examples of 
majority mistakes and wrongs we~e best summed up by fo1mer 
Senator James Ao Reed of Mis5ouri during th~ 1917 debate o·ver 
Rule XXII with these words: 
0 Majority rule! Where is the logic or the reason to bt: found 
back of majority rule except in the mere necessity to dispatch 
business? The fact that a majority of 1 or 10 vote for a bill in 
the Senate is not a certification that the action is righto The 
majority has been wrong often~r than it has been right in all the 
course of time. The majority crucified Jesus Christ. The majority 
burned the Christians at the stakee The majority drov·e the Jews 
into exile and the ghetto. 'l'he majority established slavery. The 
majority se·~ up innumerable gibbets. The majority chained to stakes 
and surrounded with circles of flame martyrs through all the ages 
of the world's history~ 
ttMajority rule without any l:..mitation or CU!'b upon the 
particular set of fools who l!eppen to be placed for the moment in 
charge of the machinery of a gover~mentt The majority grinned and 
jeered when Columbus said the world was roll.'ld,, The majority threw 
him into a <lu.ngeon for having discove:i:-ed a nP-w world. The majority 
said that Galileo must reca~1t or that Galileo must go to prison. 
II 
years 
ree debate in the Senate, 
majority 
times. 
power. 
has 
ament, 
. 
, ·•. 'The majority cut off the ears of John Pym because he dared advocate 
the liberty of . the press." 
Since Senator Reed made his great fight to 
an outstanding example of 
cost the world the most devastating war of all 
to the action of the majority in placing Hitler in 
this occurred he had a 100 per cent majority in 
but even this did not make Hitler's policies 
right. per cent votes of the people of 
Soviet Russia in Communist Party -- together with 
the unanimous al of the Supreme Soviet Presidium -- make the 
policies of the Kre leaders best for the people or right, in 
any sense of the 
There is no rm of tyranny than the tyranny imposed by 
51 per cent of the peopl 49 per cent. 
The Senate rules, an important safeguard 
No doubt there have 
was delayed because 
times when desirable legislation 
the Senate took advantage of 
the opportunities which the rul afford to block legislation. 
to individual liberty. 
But 
there have been few times, when important legislation of a 
genuinely desirable nature nently defeated because a 
minority stood against it. 
The rules provide opportunities They do not provide 
a method for the minority to impose its ill permanently on a 
majority. In fact, the record shows that 
legislation have been defeated by resort It is 
true that there have been delays, but of the which have 
been subjected to extended debate have never 
passed. One of these proposals, the unconstitutio bill to remove 
the poll tax from State election lawbooks, was offer on four 
different occasions. My State of South Carolina o removed 
the poll tax voting requirement, as have all but five States 
which originally enacted such legislation. The control of 
however, is a power reserved to the States, and the Federal 
ment has no business repealing a State election law. 
IZ 
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v Mr. President, in connection with this vitally-important question 
of the preservation of Rule XXII, I should like to quote briefly 
some comments made by two of the most outspoken opponents of the 
present rule. 
In the course of an address delivered on March 29, 1957, at Ohio 
State University, the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois 
~-as-) made this statement, referring to the adoption of the 
present rule: 
"What, in effect, has been done is to adopt John c. Calhoun's 
theory of concurrent majorities, under which a majority in the 
country or in Congress is not permitted to pass legislation unless 
it also meets with the approval of the majority of each and every 
section of the country. The failure of Calhoun and the South to 
establish this principle prior to 1860 was one of the factors 
which led to the Civil War. Its quiet adoption in modern times may 
well lead us to reconsider just who in the long run won that war." 
In the same vein, the senior Senator from New York (-Mp.. Ja'lits) 
in his statement appearing in the Report of the Committee on Rules 
and Administration, dated April JO, 195$, declared as follows, 
again referring to the principle embodied in Rule XXII: 
11This kind of balance, which the opponents of civil-rights 
legislation wish to retain in the Senate, is a modern version of 
Calhoun's 'concurrent majorities.' It was such a sectional right 
of veto and interposition that Calhoun and other States-rights 
advocates urged during the debates, in and out of Congress, that led 
up to the Civil War. This type of imbalance, however, finds no 
support in the Constitution nor in current practice outside of 
Rule XXII. 0 
Both of these distinguished Senators imply very strongly that 
the principle of the concurrent majority is a bad thing, an 
undesirable thing, something which all good AmericanSshould abhor. 
This basic and general objection on their parts, I shall discuss 
in a few moments. First, however, I wish to address myself to the 
further statement made by the Senctor from New York, to the effect 
that the doctrine of the concurrent majority is a repudiated and 
rejected theory which does not even exist in our system outside 
!.3 
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of Rule XXII--if I may again quote the Senator's words, for 
emphasis, "This type of imbalance, however, finds no support in 
the Constitution nor in current practice outside of Rule XXII." 
The Senator is very badly mistaken. How he can have been on 
the American political scene as long as he has and still make that 
statement, is beyond my comprehension. As a matter of fact, the 
principle of the concurrent majority--a principle, by the way, 
which was not invented by Calhoun, but rather was enunciated by 
him--is the very foundation and basis of the American political 
system. True, the specific factor involved in Rule XXII is a very 
important aspect of the concurrent majority principle; but to say 
that concurrent majority does not exist in actual practice outside 
of Rule XXII is to be blind to the entire political mechanism of 
our country. 
A number of years ago, there appeared in Harper's Magazine 
(issue of November, 1948) a most interesting and informative article 
by the very able and very liberal writer, Mr. John Fischer, who has 
since become editor of the magazine. This article, which is 
entitled "Unwritten Rules of American Politics," bears so directly 
on the issue before us today, and the author has set down his 
thoughts so ably and so clearly, that I should like to quote several 
passages from this article, at some length, if I may. 
In contrast to the two distinguished Senators, who apparently 
regard Calhoun's theories as suspect or sinister, or, it would 
appear, downright un-American, Mr. Fischer, "liberal" though he is, 
subscribes wholeheartedly to the view (expressed previously by 
Dr. Peter F. Drucker of Bennington College) that Calhoun's ideas 
are "a major if not the only key to the understanding of what is 
specifically and uniquely American in our political systemo" 
Mr. Fischer writes as follows: 
"Calhoun summed up his political thought in what he called the 
Doctrine of the Concurrent Majority. He saw the United States as 
a nation of tremendous and frightening diversity--a collection of 
many different climates, races, cultures, religions, and economic 
patterns. He saw the constant tension among all these special 
interests, and he realized that the central problem of American 
politics was to find some way of holding these conflicting groups 
together. 
I 'f 
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"It could not be done by force; no one group was strong enough 
to impose its will on all the others. The goal could be achieved 
only by compromise--and no real compromise could be possible if 
any threat of coercion lurked behind the door. Therefore 0 Calhoun 
reasoned, every vital decision in American life would have to be 
adopted by a 'concurrent majority'--by which he meant, in effect, 
a unanimous agreement of all interested parties. No decision which 
affected the slaveholders, he argued, should be taken without their 
consent; and by implication he would have given a similar veto to 
every other special interest, whether it be labor, management, the 
Catholic church, old-age pensioners, the silver miners~ or the 
corngrowers of the Middle West." 
Now at this point, Mr. President, Mro Fischer ventures his opinim 
that, "under the goad of the slavery issue, Calhoun was driven to 
state his doctrine in an extreme and unworkable form;" but he makes 
it clear that this fact does not detract from the basic soundness 
of the doctrine itself. Mre Fischer goes on to explain the concurrent 
majority doctrine, as follows: 
" •••Government by concurrent majority can exist only when no one 
power is strong enough to dominate completely, and then only when all 
of the contending interest groups recognize and abide by certain 
rules of the game. 
"These rules are the fundamental bond of unity in American 
political lifeQ They can be summed up as a habit of extraordinary 
toleration, plus 'equality' in the peculiar American meaning of 
that term which cannot be translated into any other language, even 
into tle English of Great Britain. Under these rules every group 
tacitly binds itself to tolerate the interests and opinions of 
every other group. It must not try to impose its views on others, 
nor can it press its own special interests to the point where they 
seriously endanger the interests of other groups or of the nation 
as a whole. 
"Furthermore, each grnup must exercise its implied veto with 
responsibility and discretion; and in times of great emergency it 
must forsake its veto right altogether. It dare not be intransigent 
or doctrinaire. It must make every conceivable effort to compromise, 
relyine on its veto only as a last resort. For if any player wields 
this weapon recklessly, the game will break up -- or all the other 
players will turn on him in anger, suspend the rules for the time 
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being, and maul those very interests he is trying so desperately 
to protect ••• 
"This is the somewhat elusive sense, it seems to me, in which 
Calhoun's theory has been adopted by the American peopleo But 
elusive and subtle as it may be, it remains the basic rule of the 
game of politics in this country ••• 0 
Mr. President, I do not wish to labor the point, but I do want 
to make sare that the Senator from New York realizes that he was very 
seriously mistaken--and I want all the Members of this body to rea~ 
that he was mistaken--when he said tha't the concurrent majority 
system "o •• finds no support ••• in current practice outside of 
Rule XIII." Therefore, I shall, for the benefit of all the Senators, 
read several additional passages from Mr. Fischer's brilliant 
article. As Mr. Fischer points out, 
"The way in which this tradition (the concurrent majority rule) 
works in practice can be observed most easily in Congress. Anyone 
who has ever tried to push through a piece of legislation quickly 
discovers that the basic units of organization on Capitol Hill are 
not the parties, but the so-called blocs, which are familiar to 
everyone who reads a newspaper. There are dozens of them--the farm 
bloc, the silver bloc, the friends of labor, the business group, 
the public power bloc--and they all cut across party lines. 
"Tlhiey are loosely organized and pretty blurred at the edges, 
so that every Congressman belongs at different times to several 
different blocso Each of them represents a special interest group. 
Each of them ordinarily works hand-in-hand with that group's 
Washington lobby. In passing, it might be noted that these 
lobbies are by no means the cancerous growth which is sometimes 
pictured in civics textbooks. They have become an indispensable 
part of the political machine--the accepted channel through which 
American citizens make their wishes known and play their day-to-day 
role in the process of governmento••• 
"Now it is an unwritten but firm rule of Congress that no 
important bloc shall ever be voted down--under normal circumstances-­
on any matter which touches its own vital interests. Each of them, 
in other words, has a tacit right of veto on legislation in which 
it is primarily concerned. The ultimate expression of this right 
is the institution--uniquely American--of the filibuster in the 
Senate. 
/b 
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Before I continue with Mr. Fischer's remarks, Mr. President, let 
me point out that Mr. Fischer is a supporter of so-called civil 
rights legislation--this is clear from his use of the word 
"ruthlessly" in his next sentence, which I shall read to you. But 
this very fact renders all the more impressive what he has to say 
in regard to the rule permitting free debate, which is as follows: 
"'Recently it has acquired a bad name among liberals because the 
Southern conservatives have used it ruthlessly to fight off civil 
rights legislation•••• Not so long ago, however, the filibuster 
was the stoutest weapon of such men as Norris and the LaFollettes in 
defending many a progressive cause--and ••• liberal Senators may well 
have cause to use it again." 
But it is not only in the Congress, Mr. President, that the 
doctrine of concurrent majority holds sway. Let me quote further 
from Mr. Fischer's article: 
"Calhoun 9s principles of the concurrent majority and of 
sectional compromise operate just as powerfully, though sometimes 
less obviously, in every other American political institution. Our 
cabinet, for example, is the only one in the world where the 
members are charged by law with the representation of special 
interests--labor, agriculture, commerce, and so on. In other 
countries, each agency of government is at least presumed to act 
for the nation as a whole; here most agencies are expected to behave 
as servants for one interest or another. The Veterans' Administratior 
to cite the most familiar case, is frankly intended to look out ~r 
Our Boys; the Maritime Commission is the spokesman for the shipping 
industry ; the National Labor Relations Board, as originally 
established under the Wagner Act, was explicitly intended to build 
up the bargaining power of the unions • 
"Calhoun 9s laws also govern the selection of virtually every 
candidate for public office@ The mystery of 'eligibility' which has 
eluded most foreign observers simply means that a candidate must not 
be unacceptable to any important special interest group--a negative 
rather than a positive qualification. A notorious case of this 
process ~t work was the selection of Mr. Truman as the Democrat's 
vice-presidential candidate in 1944. As Edward J. Flynn, the Boss 
...--
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the Bronx, has pointed out in his memoirs, Truman was the ohe 
'who would hurt ••• least• as Roosevelt's running mate. Manyman 
stronger men were disqualified, Flynn explained, by the tacit veto 
of one sectional interest or another. Wallace was unacceptable t~ 
the business men and to many local party machines. Byrnes was 
dist'asteful to the Catholics, the Negroes, and organized labor. 
Rayburn came from the wrong part of the country. Truman., however., 
came from a border State, his labor record was good., he had not 
antagonized the conservatives, and--as Flynn put it--'he had never 
made any '1racial" remarkso He just dropped into the slot.' 
"The same kind of considerations gove~n the selection of 
candidates right down to the county., city and precinct levels. 
Flynn, one of the most successful political operators of our time, 
explained in some detail the complicated job of making up a ticket 
in his own domainQ Each of the main population groups in the 
Bronx--Italians, Jews., and Irish Catholics--must be properly 
represented on the list of nominees., and so must each of the main 
geographical divisions. The result is a ticket which sounds like 
the roster of the Brooklyn Dodgers: Loreto, Delagi, Lyman, Joseph., 
Lyons, and Foley. 
"Comparable traditions govern the internal political life of 
the American Legion, the Federation of Women's Clubs, university 
student bodies., labor unions, Rotary Clubs., and the thousands of 
other quasi-political institutions which are so characteristic of 
society and which give us such a rich fabric of spontaneousour 
local government." 
As I said at the outset, the first step I was undertaking in this 
address was to show beyond any peradventure of a doubt that the 
Senator from New York was in error--utterly and completely in 
error--when he said that Calhoun's Doctrine 'l1a'.finds no support ••• 
in current practice outside of Rule XXII. 11 I believe that the 
passages which I have read from Mr. Fischer's article have served 
to prove my point, more than satisfactorily; and I am sure that 
the Senator will, upon fair consideration, admit that he was 
indeed in error. 
,a 
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So now that we have established the point that the a~ctrine 
of concurrent majorities, of which the rule permitting unlimited 
debate is a very vital part, is in actuality the very foundation­
stone of our entire political system here in America--~ we can 
turn to the question of whether it is desirable, or undesirable, 
that we continue that srstem. 
Certainly , I would not argue--I hope no one in the South would 
argue--that we ought to continue to follow any particular system 
or doctrine simply because it was enunciated and developed by a 
great Southerner, Calhoun. Nor do I think that anyone would say that 
the fact that the concurrent majority doctrine is, and always has 
been, the basic doctrine of American politics is, in and of itself, 
sufficient reason not to scrap that doctrine if it can be 
successfully attacked on its merits. 
So let us do just that, Mr. President, let us go to the merits 
of the case. Let us look at Rule XXII, not only from the stand­
point of its guarantee of the most thorough and searching debate 
of every minute (but often vital) detail of a proposed piece of 
legislation. Let us, for the moment, look at Rule XXII in its vital 
role as a key mechanism of the concurrent majority system--as a sort 
of minority veto, if you will. And let us be quite frank to state 
that that that is just what Rule XXII actually is--for, in addition 
to guaranteeing full and complete exploration of the issues, 
Rule XXII does, or may) fulfill the function of a sort of minority 
veto--at least a partial one--against hostile legislation passed 
by the majority. 
I do not think that anyone can contend now, Mr. President, that 
we are not meeting the issue fairly and squarely. And, thus meetir:g 
!t~ I contend,Mr. President, that the principle embodied in Rule XXII . 
far from being harmful or undesirable, is on the contrary valuable, 
beneficial, indeed indispensable, to the national welfare; because, 
as a vital part of the concurrent majority system, it is the surest 
protection of the rights of minorities against the tyranny of 
numerical majorities. 
That, Mr. President, is the primary reason why we must 
steadfastly oppose any weakening of the principle embodied in 
Rule XXII--on that principle depends the protection of minority 
rights in this country. 
11 
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At this point, let me make it clear, Mr. President, that when 
speak of "minorities.," I use the term in its broad and general 
and universal sense (as employed by Calhoun and by Mr. Fischer) 
as applying to any type of minority group., whether it be 
sectional, ethnic, economic., religious, or otherwise; and not in 
the narrow and restricted meaning of the term., given it in 
recent years by those who would appropriate it to the exclusive 
use of certain racial and ethnic groups., the members of which are, to 
a large extent., located in politically-strategic metropolitan 
areas of the North~ 
Bearing always in mind, then, Mro President, this broad and 
true concept of the term "minority," I contend that Rule XXII is 
in the long run a valuable., probably the most valuable, protection 
possessed by minority groups in this country. For minorities, 
of whatever k:l.r..d, Rule XXII is a shield agai?J.:.:; t ty:r~rmical 
legislation by the ma jority. It is, let me emphasize, a shield-­
never a sword, but only a shield; for it is a negative and not a 
positive power(, It is a power by which the minority can, at the 
most, only prevent (and, usually, only modify) hostile legislation 
by the majority--it does not enable the minority to impose harmful 
legislation on the majorityo It is a purely defensive weapon~ 
and it is, I repeat, an indispensable one, if minorities in our 
society are to have any meaningful protection. 
And why should not a minority be entitled to protection, where 
its own vital interest is concerned, against seriously-harmfui 
legislative action by a majority whose interests are not directly 
or vitally involved? 1 believe that such a minority should have 
such protection; I _believe that such a minority is entitled to a 
defensive veto. 
Evidently, the distinguished senior Senator from Illinois does 
not believe that a minority should be thus entitled to protection; 
either that., or he does not accord the great sectional minority 
known as the South the official status of being a "minority" at 
all (he being one of those, perhaps, whom I mentioned earlier as 
reserving the sacred term "minority" for the exclusive use of 
certain racial and religious groups which have a potent voting 
concentration in certain key urban areas of the North--such as for 
instance, Cook County, Illinois). 
Mr. President, I hesitate to venture at this point into the 
area of "civil rights," an area so emotionally-charged, an area so 
complex--an area in which there are wheels within wheels, and 
problems within problems. But I know that members of the opposition 
will bring it up anyway--in fact, many of them are frank to stcte 
that their primary reason for seeking to emasculate Rule XXII is to 
facilitate the passage of more and more so-called civil rights 
legislation-- ; and so I may as well go ahead and use this explosive 
field as my first example. 
Mr. President, in the same address from which I quoted earlier 
today, the Senator from Illinois had this to say in regard to the 
use of the "filibuster" to block legislation: " ••• In practice it 
is probably limited ••• to those questions which a majority of the 
country as a whole favors, but which the voters of a large section 
bitterly oppose ••• Civil rights legislation furnishes such an issue. 
The articulate sentiment of the South is vigorously opposed~ And 
while public opinion in the North and West is on the whole 
favorable, it is in the~in only tepidly so." 
The Senator has put his finger right on it. Here is an issue, 
in which the minority section--the South--, its own deepest interests 
being vitally concerned, is (as he puts it) "vigorously opposed" 
to the legislation, and in which the majority section {the North 
and West, that is, the u. s. outside the Sen.th) is, while on the 
whole favorable, only tepidly favorable--the reason for this 
tepidness being, of ccurse, that in most areas of the majority 
section the problem is viewed only from the standpoint of theory · 
and not that of practical conditions. 
Now admittedly, this "civil Rights" question is in some respects 
a somewhat atypical situation, in that, in addition to the usual 
..,, 
elements of the tepid, not-directly-affected majority (the Ngrth 
and West as a whole) and the vitally-concerned and immediately­
affected major minority--the SouthO., we have in this case also 
another, smaller, minority, namely the artificially-, emotionally­
(let us simply say, politically-) stimulated, and politically-potent, 
minority known as the Northern Negro. This is what I meant when 
I spoke of this problem as a complex one, having wheels within 
wheels. But the fact still remains that, speaking of the Northern 
·population as a whole, we have in this situation a majority not 
Z I 
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directly concerned and so only tepidly in favor, and on the other 
hand a minority--the South--which, since its vital interest--its 
most vital domestic interest--is directly and immediately at stake, 
is passionately opposedo 
I say, Mr. President, that in such a situation, the minority is 
entitled to a form of partial veto by which it can prevent or at 
least modify extreme legislation--a protection which is how 
afforded by Rule XXII. Here we have a large and important minority 
section of the country, the South, faced with legislation which 
would seriously and adversely affect it in its most vital domestic 
interest--by all means, that minority is entitled, under all the 
rules of our system as set forth so ably by Mr. Fischer, to the 
protection which Rule XXII a.:ffbrds. 
e e e e • e O O e 
But let us turn from civil rights to another field, a field where 
the issaes can be viewed more dispassionately than they possibly 
could, at the present time and in the present atmosphere, in any 
field involving questions of race. Let us leave the South and turn 
to the West. 
Throughout far the greater part of this huge region, which 
comprises more than half of the nation's area--all or part of 
seventeeJ!J/ge States--, arid or semi-arid climatic conditions 
prevail. The fact that rainfall is light and that water is therefore 
in short supply is perhaps the £oremost fact that must be kept in 
mind in any consideration of the West. The historian Walter Prescott 
Webb has gone so far as to say that "The overriding influence that 
shapes the West is the desert." 
I do not imagine that that is an overstatement. If it can be 
said that the cardinal problem of the South has been the problem of 
the Negro, it can also be said, perhaps even more truly, that the 
great problem of the west, throughout its history, has been the 
problem of water--or, rather, the lack of it. 
Q':; I realize that, especially with the increasing industrial uses 
of water, the question of insufficient water supply is becoming a 
national problem, in a sense. But in a sense only, and never in the 
Western sense. Nowhere in the humid East or South is water the 
problem, or even the kind of problem, that it is, a1d always has 
been, throughout the arid and semi-arid West. To be sure, we in the 
/o 
Southeastern States have known periods of droughts, sometimes severe 
ones, and I am sure that the same has been true of New England 
and the Central States; but the farmers of our green and fertile 
and well-watered eastern half of the country have never known 
the life-or-death importance of water with quite the degree of 
ho.Soimmediacy and intimacy that saiie been the lot of the Western 
farmer or rancher. 
A drought such as those we occasionally have in the South can 
cause great harm to individual farmers and sometimes can even .-1 ... 
adversely affect the economies of considerable areas; but, 
comparatively speaking, the effect is generally only temporary, 
~ ~ to the blessed fact of our abundant average annual rainfall. 
But in the West, droughts have virtually depopulated whole sections 
of States and causaivast migrations of stricken farm families ; 
b.1.~,~
and the scarcity of water, to 'b-S'og with, has stifled the 
development, and in some cases completely prevented the settlement, 
of tremendous areas of the West. Small wonder then, that the problem 
of water looms so large in the Western mindl No wonder at all 
that the question of control, development, and distribution of 
what water supplies do exist is, and long has been, a burning 
political, economic and social issue throughout the Western 
States--the West's most vital domestic concern. 
Now, Mr. President, let us suppose that we are faced with a 
legislative proposal concerning water policy, one that would effect 
major and far-reaching changes in present water policy. It might be 
a bill which w:,uld have the effect of nullifying State water 
rights and vesting total control of water supplies in Western areas 
in the Federal government ; it might deal with irrigation and 
reclamation projects; or it might be a bill dealing with watershed 
control which would forbid State or Federal public power projects 
or which would have the effect of handing over control of Western 
water resources to utility holding companies. For the purposes of 
this argument, however, the exact proposal embodied in the bill does 
not matter. Let us simply say that it is a broad and far-reaching 
bill dealing with water policy. 
Let us further assume, Mr. President, that public sentiment in 
the eastern half of the country is, in the main, favorable to ~he 
L I 
legislation. Only tepidly so, to be sure, to follow the wording 
of the Senator from Illinois--tepidly, because, their part of 
the country not being directly affected one way or the other, they 
really don Vt care very much about the issue. But still, on the 
basis of some editorials they have read in their newspapers, or 
some articles in picture magazines, and since, superficially at 
least, the announced purpose• of the bill seem to be pretty much 
in accord with their political philosophies; since, in short, the 
proposal looks like a pretty fair deal which might bolster the 
national economy (at least its proponents say so), they are in 
favor of it rather than opposed to it. 
To make the situation a little more complex politically, and 
also to keep it somewhat analogous to the civil-rights situation, 
let us add to 'this tepid majority of the national public a very 
un-tepid group of utility companies, headquartered in the East 
but ~ith interests in the West, and their financier allies--the 
real proponents of this bill, who stand to gain incredibly enormous 
profits if it becomes law. This element having considerable 
political power and, as already stated, the majority of the public 
at large being in favor of the proposal, albeit tepidly so, a 
majority of Senators are lined up in favor of the bill. 
But let us say, Mr. President, that the people of the Western 
States\ are passionately and almost unanimously opposed tofue 
bill, because they are convinced that its passage will seriously 
and adversely affect their most vital interests. Conceivably the 
bill could be fatally destructive of the entire economic and social 
structure of most of the West. 
Now if this were the situation, under the present rules, 
Mr. President, you know what would happen to that bill. It would 
never get through the Senater in fact, it would probably never 
even be seriously proposed, at least wittc~t substantial modificaticn, 
for the prospect of a determined filibuster by twenty or thirty 
Western Senators would, as the Senator from New York expressed it, 
"make the majority come to terms." 
But take away Rule XXII, that shield and buckler of minorities, 
and this or any other outrage could be imposed on the West or any 
other minority element in our country. My distinguished colleagues 
from New York and Illinois, and their allies, would have it so. 
- ~ .
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They would give to a simple majority CJf' this body virtually 
absolute power over minorities. Apparently, Mr. President, they 
worship King Numbers. I want to make it clear . that, like 
John Randolph of Roanoke, I do not. And I want to say, 
Mr. President, that it will be a sad day for minorities in this 
country of ours when the Members of this body, in derogation of 
their long-followed tradition of concurrent majority, shall scrap 
the benign and moderating influence of Rule XXII and substitute 
instead the rule of King Numbers--the most tyrannical ruler that 
ever livede 
• • • • • 0 • 
Mr. President, minority groups are not the only beneficiaries 
of Rule XXII. The greatest beneficiary of Rule XXII is the country 
as a whole. The emasculation of Rule XXII would be a blow to 
minorities, but it would be also a tragedy to the whole country. 
For Rule XXII -- the mere existence of the rule -- accomplishes 
two very great things for the country: First, by discouraging 
extreme legislation in any direction, and preventing violent swings 
from left to right, it promotes stability in government. Second, 
by giving minorities a defensive shield against tyranny, it 
discourages the arising of tensions and situations which could, 
and probably would, lead to various and frequent forms of civil 
strife, perhaps actual civil war. 
By way of explaining what some may at first thought deem rather 
extravagant claims in behalf of Rule XXII, let me read a paragraph 
from the previously-mentioned Individual Views of the senior 
Senator from the State of New York. He says: 
The ability to carry on a filibuster can affect the 
kind of legislation passed by the Senate even though no 
actual filibuster is undertaken. The incidence of a 
filibuster or the certain knowledge that a filibuster 
would be organized has made the majority come to terms 
before. The mere threat that a filibuster of great length
would be undertaken against some proposal or unless amendment 
to a bill was accepted has in effect resulted in the 
majority of the Senate acquiescing in changes in legislation•••• 
The distinguished Senator is quite correct in his statement --
I agree with his analysis completely. The state of facts is just 
as he has put it. That is the way it is. Furthermore and this 
is where the Senator and I part company, unfortunately--, I 
maintain that it is right and good and fortunate for the country 
that that is the way it is ; and I hope and pray that that is the way 
it will continue to bee 
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For if the Rule should be changed, as the Senator would have it 
changed, so that legislative power would be absolute in a bare 
majority of the Members of this Body, our country would lose its 
political stability. Our society, instead of continuing to follow 
a generally middle-of-the-road course, would soon be characterized 
by violent swings from right to left, from conservative to radical 
and then back to ultra-conservative, from aggrandizement of a 
given interest group to extreme oppression of that interest group. 
submit, Mr. President, that our country would be much the poorer 
for all this. 
As matters stand now, due to the mere existence of Rule XXII, 
the mere overhanging threat of a filibuster by any minority whose 
vital interest would be seriously threatened by a proposed piece 
of legislation, exerts a healthy moderating influence against 
extremes in any direction, against unconscionable oppression of 
any minority interest. 
Mark now, let me again emphasize, this by no means constitutes 
what the opposition would have it, "minority rule" -- it is only 
a defensive power in the minority to prevent extreme tyranny by 
the majority. And, as Mr. Fischer pointed out, this veto is not 
used recklessly or with abandon; it is not something to be wielded 
lightly, but only when confronted by the most extreme peril; its 
use is reserved for only those issues deemed the very most vital 
to the well-being of the minority in question. The reason for 
this is, of course, two-fold: First, it is neither an easy nor a 
pleasant exercise to conduct a filibuster. Second, the minority 
which today is making use of the negative power of the filibuster 
in order to block legislation must always remember that tomorrow 
it will be needing legislative allies from among various other 
blocs in order to pass some desired piece of positive legislation. 
As Mr. Fischer expresses it: 
The farm bloc, for instance, normally needs no outside 
aid to halt the passage of a hostile bill. As a last resort, 
three or four strong-lunged statesmen from the corn belt can 
always filibuster it to death in the Senate. If the bloc 
wants to put through a measure to support agricultural prices,
however, it can succeed only by enlisting the help of other 
powerful special interest groups. Consequently, it must 
always be careful not to antagonize any potential ally by 
a reckless use of the veto•••• 
But I have digressed somewhat. As I was saying, Rule XXII as 
it now stands, providing as it does the ever-present threat of a 
filibuster by any minority which would be critically-threatened, 
exerts a healthy and moderating influence on legislation. Take 
away that rule and the inherent protection for minorities which 
it provides, and a bare majority of Senators could, and would, 
ram through whatever legislation they might choose, no matter how 
extreme, how punitive, or how fatal to the interests of any segment 
of our society. 
Given a sharp split on some clear-cut major issue, in one year 
a bill which goes to extremes in one direction would be passed; a 
slight shift in Senate membership in a succeeding session could 
result in a violent swing in the opposite direction. One year, 
in which the radical forces were in a slight majority in the Senate 
and also had the Presidency, a labor-relations code that was 
strongly pro-labor and anti-management could become law; a very 
slight shift in popular sentiment could result the next year (say 
it was a presidential year) in a conservative Presidant, and in a 
Senate in which conservatives, instead of radicals, held a bare 
majority, and in place of the bill that was pro-labor, a union­
crippling, flagrantly pro-management bill would be passed. One 
Congress would nationalize the railroads, or the steel industry, 
the next would denationalize them; and so on and on, issue upon 
issue, ad infinitum. How long, Mr. President, could our government, 
our economy and our society survive such intolerable instability? 
But the moderating influence which Rule XXII exerts on legislation 
does more than merely promote order and stability in our government 
and in our society; it is not too much to say that Rule XXII insures 
the very survival of that government and that society. For, by 
preventing extreme oppression of sectional or other minorities in 
this country, it discourages the arising of those tensions and 
resentments and feelings of injustice and frustration which 
otherwise would explode in civil war. (We would do well to remember 
that on one of the very few major occasions in our history that 
the rules of the game were suspended and an important minority was 
completely overridden by the majority -- namely, when the South 
was overridden by the anti-slavery combination, resulting in the 
election to the Presidency of a totally sectional President and the 
dominance of a frankly sectional party which was non-existent in 
the South--, the result !ls.§. the dissolution of the government and 
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four years of bloody war.) People today tend to think of serious 
domestic violence or war as somethirg which happened in the distant 
past and which would never happen again. But the reason why we 
have had internal stability in this country since the end of the 
Reconstruction has been precisely because, from 1877 to the present 
(with perhaps one exception, during the early years of the New Deal), 
the Doctrine of the Concurrent Majority has been scrupulously 
followed~ With the close of the experiment of Reconstruction, says 
Mr. Fischer, "American politics ••• swing back into its normal path 
and has never veered far away from it since. Although Calhoun's 
cause was defeated, his political theory came through the Civil 
War stronger than ever." 
Mr. President, if we in this country try to get away from 
Calhoun's eternal political truths; if we throw over the Doctrine 
of the concurrent majority; or if we gravely weaken that doctrine, 
as we will do if we cast aside Rule XXII, which is one of its 
cardinal features -- if we do that, Mr. President, our country is 
headed for disaster. Let us be frank, let us be blunt, and say 
that our country is headed for civil upheaval. I am not threatening, 
Mr. President, or predicting, that the conflict or conflicts 
which will surely arise will be, as in 1860, between the North and 
the South. I cannot say, I do not know, at the present time, just 
where the lines of division will be drawno I do not know whether 
the divisions will be along sectional lines at all, or whether 
they will be along economic or ideological lines, or an overlapping 
combination of all of these. But I do know this: that when a 
minority, especially if it is a fairly sizable or powerful one, 
feels the tyranny of the unrestrained majority, feels the oppression 
of extreme legislation which this unchecked majority will 
inevitably impose; when the minority can no longer defend i~self 
by means of the shield that is Rule XXII then, Mr. President, 
then you are going to see that minority -- perhaps, indeed probably, 
in concert with other minorities which have likewise felt majority
• 
oppression -- take steps to protect itself !2x, whatevf r means it 
• 
finds at its disposal -- by intrigue, conspiracy, and coup d'etat 
if possible, by bloody revolution if necessary. Nor could we blame 
them, we who had taken from them their peaceful defensive shield, 
their peaceful political form of protection -- for there is no more 
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harsh rule than the rule of King Numbers, no worse tyranny than the 
tyranny of the unrestrained majority. 
Yet that, Mr. President, is what the Senator from Illinois, the 
Senator from New York, and their allies, would impose upon us -­
although, of course, this result would be the fart~est thing 
from their intention. How fatal is shortsightedness, how tragic 
the result of taking the short-range view1 Here we have a group 
of Senators, with the avowed purpose of improving the status and 
well-being of minority groups in this countrye And, tragically 
taking the short-range view instead of the long view, how do they 
propose to go about it? By introducing a measure which, if adopted, 
will do more, in the long run, to curtail the rights and destroy 
the well-being of minorities than any other measure ever introduced 
in this Body; and which would, at the same time, be detrimental, 
perhaps fatal, to the well-being of the country as a whole. 
Mr. President, the Members of this Body now know the facts; they 
know what is at stake. It is within their power to prevent this 
tragedy's coming to pass. They have a terrible responsibility. 
May they have the vision to look beyond the short view and the 
strength to act in accordance with the long-range well-being, not 
only of minority groups, but of the United States of America. 
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